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Leftist Politics and the Limits of  
Microcredit in Argentina 
Ronald Ahnen 
Abstract: The success of microcredit lending programs depends in part 
on the regulatory framework that policymakers create to support them. 
A fact that many microcredit analyses often ignore or overlook is that 
this framework is shaped by both ideological and partisan political con-
siderations of policymakers. In Argentina, the Peronist governments of 
Néstor and Cristina Kirchner launched and supported a state-centered 
microcredit program characterized by strict loan conditions and direct 
state grants for capital and operational costs to existing non-profit organ-
izations that were largely supportive of Peronism. Provinces and munici-
palities governed by anti-Peronists refused to participate. As a result, the 
National Microcredit Program has come to mimic past patronage based 
policies to a significant extent, engendering dependency on government 
resources, and thereby threatening its long-term viability. This article 
explores the impact of the left’s ideological and political project on mi-
crocredit policy, implementation, and outcomes in Argentina. 
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Introduction 
Latin America is well into its second decade of major growth in micro-
credit financing. While many microcredit and microfinance projects 
began as early as the 1970s, these programs have taken off in the new 
century, growing from a regional portfolio of USD 590 million in 2000 
to over USD 40.2 billion in 2014 (Mix Market 2016). This surge is due to 
several factors that have increased microcredit as an attractive alternative 
to extant anti-poverty programs, including the UN’s declaration of 2005 
as the Year of Microcredit, the awarding of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize 
to Muhammad Yunus for his work with the Grameen Bank in Bangla-
desh, and the subsequent promotion of microcredit methodologies by 
international and regional development banks and other international 
financial institutions (IFIs). 
Notwithstanding the amount of passion and resources put toward 
microcredit programs in Latin America, several studies have pointed to 
the dangers, pitfalls, or limits of the same (Bédécarrats, Bastiaensen, and 
Doligez 2012; Brett 2006; Bastiaensen et al. 2013; Bateman 2006; Chow-
dhury 2007; Lucarelli 2005; Warby 2016). Throughout these analyses, 
scholars have emphasized how unquestioned assumptions about incen-
tives, cultural differences, and differentiated strategies to overcome credit 
failure have undermined or limited the positive impact of microcredit 
programs in many locales. The results of such studies often emphasize 
caution regarding the power of microcredit to achieve the practice’s 
major goals of poverty alleviation and social inclusion, and call for speci-
fied program design reforms (Schreiner and Colombet 2001; Bekerman 
and Cataife 2004). 
However, an issue that is often underemphasized, if not absent, 
from these studies is the critical variable of politics. Analyses of micro-
credit policy in the economic development, business, and anthropology 
literatures have focused on institutional structure, lending processes, 
financial incentives, cultural constraints, and domestic or global contexts 
to explain key outcomes such as overall efficacy, efficiency, growth, 
breadth and depth of lending patterns, and repayment rates. In so doing, 
these studies commonly ignore the manner and style in which govern-
ment leaders design and implement microcredit programs in ways that fit 
with their ideological principles or partisan political goals. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, as microcredit practices began to spread, 
Latin American governments were far less proactive in fostering micro-
credit programs than they are now, and thus these initial analytical ap-
proaches may be justified. Recently, however, policymakers and other 
actors have played a more prominent role in supporting and regulating 
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the emerging microcredit sector. Beyond fostering and nurturing the 
dissemination of microlending practices, their actions and strategies are 
sometimes motivated by more myopic, shorter-term political goals such 
as fostering electoral support or aligning state policy with one’s partisan 
views. Thus, factors such as the ideological worldview of the current 
government, and key characteristics of political parties and the political 
party system, are likely to influence the nature and shape of microcredit 
policy. 
The main purpose of the present study is to examine these relation-
ships in the case of Argentina under Presidents Néstor and Cristina 
Kirchner. Why Argentina? The focus on Argentina as a case study is 
justified because of the strong anomaly it represents in the field of mi-
crocredit. Specifically, Argentina has a very high level of unmet demand 
with respect to microcredit services. Among 21 Latin American coun-
tries for which sufficient data are available, Argentina has the absolute 
lowest number of microcredit borrowers per capita. At least four coun-
tries that are less wealthy than Argentina have rates that are more than 
200 times the level of Argentine microcredit borrowers. In addition, 
Argentina passed a new microcredit law (Law 26,117) in 2006 to tailor, 
guide and disseminate microlending practices throughout the country. 
This analysis seeks to understand how partisan politics influenced the 
making of this law, and explores the consequences for the program’s 
implementation and outcomes. 
The central argument presented here is that leftist ideology played a 
major role in shaping how microcredit policies are fashioned and imple-
mented in Argentina. To wit, the Kirchners proposed and implemented a 
state-centric model as they viewed the state as a key instrument in coun-
tering negative market outcomes and forging a more just society. Recent 
studies have focused on explaining the rise Latin America’s “pink tide” 
(Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Weyland 2009) and assessing the various 
goals of leftist governments (Teichman 2009; Huber and Stephens 2012). 
Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010) assessed major social policies along 
three major dimensions or self-proclaimed goals of leftist governments: 
increasing social equity, ensuring macro-economic sustainability, and 
increasing political inclusion. Their analysis suggests that leftist govern-
ments can be usefully characterized along a continuum according to the 
extent to which the government respects democratic practices and sees 
value in economic market mechanisms. 
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Table 1.  Number of Borrowers per 100,000 Population Reporting to Mix 
Market 2014 
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Argentina 5 20,875 29,197,423 42,980 49 --
Venezuela 1 57,224 360,518,941 30,694 186 4
Uruguay 1 7,210 10,050,193 3,420 211 4
Costa Rica 14 25,872 73,940,925 4,758 544 11
Guyana 1 4,235 13,519,239 764 554 11
Jamaica 1 18,259 11,344,690 2,783 656 13
Panama 5 45,157 182,131,075 3,868 1,168 24
Guatemala 18 207,294 199,320,142 16,015 1,294 26
Brazil 23 2,917,198 2,811,430,841 206,078 1,416 29
Haiti 5 169,150 87,079,621 10,572 1,600 33
Chile 4 293,610 1,897,323,946 17,763 1,653 34
El Salvador 14 144,323 404,004,034 6,108 2,363 48
Honduras 22 209,647 342,134,234 7,962 2,633 54
Mexico 50 4,263,368 4,337,252,237 125,386 3,400 69
Nicaragua 24 259,343 370,114,400 6,014 4,312 88
Colombia 21 2,742,062 6,390,107,690 47,791 5,738 117
Dominican 
Republic 
14 605,415 830,849,003 10,406 5,818 119
Ecuador 48 1,632,433 4,709,947,829 15,903 10,265 209
Bolivia 22 1,253,104 5,446,146,244 10,562 11,864 242
Peru 48 4,094,488 10,054,378,484 30,973 13,219 270
Paraguay 5 890,800 1,593,834,553 6,553 13,595 277
Total  19,861,067 40,154,625,744 607,351
Average  3270 67
* in 1,000s     
Source:  Mix Market (2016), UNDESA (2016). 
On one hand, governments such as Bachelet’s in Chile or Lula’s in Brazil 
exemplify a more social democratic path in which democratic processes 
are maintained, strengthened or solidified, and social and economic poli-
cies play a more moderate role in income distribution and poverty allevi-
ation as market mechanisms continue to play a central role in guiding 
private development decisions. On the other hand, populist govern-
ments, exemplified by the likes of Chavez in Venezuela and Morales in 
Bolivia, are less concerned with market signals and instead institute poli-
cies and programs that are less constrained by democratic accountability 
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mechanisms. Ultimately, Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010) found that 
social policies in the latter countries were rife with political payoffs, inef-
ficient, did not take corrective action, and ultimately failed at major leftist 
goals. Interestingly, those authors saw the case of Argentina – while not 
one of the four key case studies of their study – as representing a middle 
path between the two extremes of the “contestatory” and “moderate” 
lefts. 
Beyond goals, however, one may also examine how political consid-
erations ultimately had an impact on design, implementation, and out-
comes. Indeed, part of the explanation for policy success or failure may 
be found in how politics shapes these areas. With respect to microcredit 
programs, several studies have suggested that leftist projects are more 
likely to include a prominent role for the state in seeking redistribution 
of income and greater social inclusion. In this case, a contestatory leftist 
administration would be more likely to control funding mechanisms or 
establish strict funding conditions (such as capping interest rates) that 
may not be congruent with market forces (Olsen 2010). Sustainability 
may be less of a concern, while breadth and depth of financial and social 
inclusion are paramount. 
Once adopted, however, policies may also be executed in a way that 
reinforces partisan political bias along familiar patterns of patronage and 
clientelistic relations (Weingod 1968; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). Ma-
drid, Weyland, and Hunter (2010) argued that a propensity for clientelis-
tic implementation and a lack of accountability mechanisms have been 
key characteristics of the “contestatory left” in Latin America. Even if 
programs were designed explicitly to be non-partisan in nature, adminis-
trators and politicians may seek to employ these newly created programs 
to advance their political project and sustain their patronage networks. 
Robinson and Verdier (2013) argued that patronage is more likely when 
clients and patrons can hold each other accountable for delivering bene-
fits and political support, respectively. They argued that public employ-
ment is one of the most well suited forms of patronage that provides for 
mutual accountability because “a job is selective and reversible, and thus 
ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particu-
lar politician” (Robinson and Verdier 2013: 260). I argue below that the 
design of the Argentine National Microcredit Program is similar in na-
ture to public employment program and created strong incentives for 
policymakers to engage in exactly these types of patron-client relations 
with this program. 
A second argument is that the shape and nature of the political are-
na also influenced, to some degree, how the policy was implemented and 
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administered. Levitsky and Roberts (2011) moved beyond the often 
observed dichotomy of supposed “good” and “bad” lefts, proposing a 
four class typology of leftist populist regimes along two dimensions: 
relative dispersion of authority and whether leaders are attached either to 
an established party organization or are part of a new movement (Rob-
erts and Levitsky 2011: 13). In their view, established party organizations 
have more limited choices because they must appease organized sectors 
with patronage, whereas leaders with more amorphous social movements 
enjoy greater latitude in terms of policymaking and are less bound by 
accountability mechanisms. For example, in their analysis the administra-
tions of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner are characterized by concentrated 
authority attached to an established party organization. Etchemendy and 
Garay (2011) noted that, unlike Chavez, Correa, or Morales, the Kirch-
ners also found it necessary to appease the organized sectors of the Pe-
ronist movement with this program by providing direct patronage to 
them, a dynamic that clearly affected the Argentine microcredit approach 
(Etchemendy and Garay 2011: 295). Thus, the type of populist regime is 
important because it shapes the array of policy levers that are open or 
closed to policymakers as they shore up legitimacy and support for their 
policies. 
In sum, I examine the impact of leftist politics on Argentina’s mi-
crocredit policy along three phases: structure/design of policy, imple-
mentation, and outcomes. I seek to uncover the ways in which ideologi-
cally driven partisan decisions by the leftist Peronist government and the 
structure of the political party organizations shaped legislation, common 
practices, and outcomes in this area. The analysis enhances our under-
standing of how and why microcredit has not grown as quickly in Argen-
tina as in other countries in the region.  
The empirical evidence for this study consists primarily of inter-
views of key stakeholders in the microcredit lending sector, including 
government leaders and policymakers, leaders of non-profit organiza-
tions who work with microcredit, and leading private sector actors in-
volved in microfinance. I conducted 33 formal interviews in June and 
July of 2012 and 2015 in five different major cities in different provinces: 
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Lomas de Zamora, Mendoza, and San Miguel de 
Tucuman.1 The findings gleaned from these interviews are buttressed by 
published and unpublished reports from national, provincial, and munic-
                                                 
1  To avoid recriminations on interviewees for their frank views on government 
performance, I report interviews confidentially unless the individual is a widely 
known public figure. 
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ipal governments, as well as business associations that are directly in-
volved in microcredit practices. 
Leftist Politics and the Design of Microcredit 
Policy 
As in other Latin American countries, Argentina had some experience 
with microlending through international foundations and agencies prior 
to the arrival of Néstor Kirchner as president in January of 2003 
(Bekerman and Cataife 2004). Almost immediately after taking power, 
however, Kirchner’s administration began a concerted effort to develop 
microcredit as a key instrument of social inclusion under the Ministry of 
Social Development. Minister Alicia Kirchner, Néstor’s sister, led the 
effort by calling together practitioners who had experience with micro-
lending to discuss the creation and implementation of a new national 
microcredit program. After substantial consultation with different 
groups, the government passed Law 26,117 on 28 June 2006 entitled 
Promoción del microcrédito para el desarrollo de la economía social, and created the 
National Microcredit Commission (CONAMI) within the ministry to 
administer the National Microcredit Program (CONAMI 2012a). 
Argentina’s National Microcredit Program differs substantially from 
other national programs in the region in several ways. First, with respect 
to terminology, the government carves out a narrow concept of “micro-
credit” and distinguishes it from microfinance. “Microcredit” refers 
exclusively to the provision of microloans in a state subsidized fashion to 
entrepreneurs employing classic parameters of this now well-known 
methodology. These parameters include (1) small loan amounts paid 
back over a relatively short period of time (six to 24 months), (2) clients 
with little or no collateral in the informal sector, (3) the use of solidarity 
groups to guarantee loans, and (4) credit decisions based on interviews 
with clients rather than formal credit scores. Microfinance, on the other 
hand, includes not only the provision of credit at unsubsidized rates and 
use of formal credit procedures and guarantees, but also other financial 
services such as checking and saving account services, personal or home 
loans, and unemployment and life insurance services (Gandulfo 2012). 
Second, while most other Latin American countries have structured 
their microcredit programs around microfinance institutions (MFIs) that 
almost exclusively offer microcredit and related services, Argentina has 
decidedly opted out of such a financial agency-centric approach. 
CONAMI administrators explained that there are at least two reasons 
why they consciously designed the program to fit into and strengthen the 
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existing structure of civil society instead of creating new, stand-alone 
MFIs. First, they viewed the organization of civil society in a nascent 
democracy (or one that has recently re-democratized) as a key compo-
nent of democratic deepening. They felt that creating a wholly new and 
different sector of MFIs would most likely pull apart the existing mesh 
of social organizations and networks in a way that would weaken rather 
than strengthen civil society. Such a move would work against the leftist 
project of consolidating democracy in the country through a vibrant and 
powerful civic sector. They also often expressed the notion that a micro-
credit program that places MFIs at its center would reflect the same 
conservative, capitalistic, exploitative, and neoliberal principles they had 
defeated at the ballot box instead of supporting economic and social 
solidarity (Gandulfo 2012). 
In addition, federal government administrators felt their model em-
bodies an economically astute strategy in that it takes advantage of exist-
ing and known social relations among network and neighborhood 
groups. If one of the key elements to a successful microcredit program is 
the intimate knowledge between lender and client (as opposed to the 
financial relations established through a credit board in the formal sec-
tor), then why not tap into that knowledge possessed by local neighbor-
hood groups? The alternative of supporting the creation of MFIs means 
that the new agencies would take a longer time to get off the ground 
given that they would most likely be established by new personnel who 
are unfamiliar with the peculiarities and challenges of a given locale’s 
economic and social conditions.2 
This strategic choice to funnel microcredit funding through civic 
organizations bears out the expectation that, in the presence of an estab-
lished, organized populist party, leaders meet the demands for patronage 
and mollify those sectors or risk losing political support (Levitsky and 
Roberts 2011). This aspect of the program appears to fit well with the 
Peronist Party’s emphasis on nurturing links to grass-roots organizations 
(Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). In the case of microcredit, state fund-
ing provided some of the operational costs of civic organizations that 
were beholden to Peronism, bankrolling a part of their labor bill while 
shoring up and strengthening support for the regime. One key conse-
quence for the microcredit sector is that it remains dispersed, loosely 
connected, heterogeneous, and operates more as an appendage of other 
non-profits instead of creating microcredit institutions in their own right. 
                                                 
2  To be clear, some for-profit and not-for-profit MFIs exist in Argentina, but 
they are very few in number. See RADIM (2017). 
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Indeed, one key difference in Argentina is that it does not have a host of 
microcredit banks or agencies compared to most Latin American coun-
tries where MFIs that specialize in microcredit thrive.  
On a slightly more technical, but not insignificant level, a third way 
to perceive how partisan politics has shaped the program is simply by 
noting the use of language. In their materials and during my interviews, 
personnel from CONAMI refused to use the word cliente (client), or even 
prestadores de crédito (credit borrowers). The notion was to see entrepre-
neurs not as economic agents, but rather as political ones – as “subjects 
with rights” (sujetos de derecho) (Gandulfo 2012). This imposition of cum-
bersome jargon ended up being more taxing than elucidating. On the 
surface, the mere use of a specific type of an overbearing leftist nomen-
clature may not have serious repercussions to revealing its nature. Never-
theless, at a minimum such jargon signals to supporters and opponents 
alike the extent of government channel funds from the program to sup-
port their ideological project. 
Fourth, the program encompasses three major “modes” of micro-
credit delivery that also differ substantially from other models in the 
region and can be linked to partisan concerns. These modes are the Con-
sortium, Network, and the Good Faith Bank (CONAMI 2012a). Con-
sortia are created at the municipal or provincial level of government and 
typically include a range of governmental and non-profit actors who 
have an interest in supporting microcredit programs. The consortium is 
led by a board of directors and includes various government administra-
tors such as the local or provincial ministers of social development, edu-
cation, or economic development, as well as leaders of non-profit organ-
izations, directors of cooperative federations, associations of small en-
trepreneurs, etc. A distinct advantage of this mode of microcredit is that 
local and provincial governments also commit financial resources to the 
consortium’s work, thereby expanding the impact of federal assistance 
and creating a “buy-in” model that is designed to support success. The 
consortia also help the federal government disseminate best practices 
while sharing the burden of costs with local governments, allowing for 
some flexibility to attend to specific local needs. The downside of this 
methodology is that municipalities or provinces controlled by political 
elites of the president’s opposition parties often refused to cooperate in 
creating consortia in their locales, which limited the spread of the micro-
credit program. 
The second form of microcredit methodology is via various types of 
networks. These networks may consist of geographically concentrated 
groups of entrepreneurs from many different branches of economic 
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activities, or may alternatively be associated through their common eco-
nomic activities. Red Gesol, for example, is a locally based network in 
Lomas de Zamora (province of Buenos Aires) that aggregates entrepre-
neurs from many different areas of economic activity. Other networks, 
such as those of artisans or farmers’ markets, aggregate members accord-
ing to their similar activities, whose members organize trade shows or 
fairs to help commercialize their products. 
The final method of microcredit delivery in Argentina is called the 
Good Faith Bank (Banco de la Buena Fe, commonly referred to as banqui-
tos). The banquitos are a service offered by organizations that do not be-
long to either a network or a consortium, but are most commonly in-
stances of grass-roots non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are 
already providing a variety of services to poor clients and wish to add 
microcredit loans to their list. In some cases, however, a banquito may be 
created independently of any existing organization for the express pur-
pose of providing microcredit. 
In all three modes of microcredit delivery, the National Microcredit 
Commission (Comisión Nacional de Microcrédito or CONAMI), located in 
the federal Ministry of Social Development, authorizes larger and more 
formally constituted member organizations to carry out the role of sec-
ond-tier lenders called “administrative organizations” (organizaciones ad-
ministradoras or OAs). The OAs receive funds directly from CONAMI 
and pass these funds on to roughly a dozen smaller organizations, which 
then lend directly to entrepreneurs. Because they execute the loans, these 
latter organizations are called “executor organizations” (organizaciones 
ejecutores or OEs). Thus, CONAMI deals directly with the OAs, which 
oversee the work of the OEs (CONAMI 2012a). 
The reliance on existing networks has two important consequences 
for microcredit in the country. First, it opens the door for the program 
to be used in a clientelistic and thus less efficient manner depending on 
implementation. The structure strengthens ties between civic groups and 
the state, but especially those that are strongly supportive of the Peronist 
project (see next section, below). Second, this institutional design forgoes 
one of the advantages of the region’s more common practice of creating 
or supporting MFIs – namely, the strong central focus on one type of 
activity and the accumulation of know-how and best practices that ulti-
mately lead to microcredit success. A small non-profit organization may 
be able to add some microcredit loans to its portfolio of services offered 
to local community members, but may not be able to afford separate or 
specialized training, conference travel, and other exchanges of micro-
credit professionals. The result is that less qualified and trained credit 
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agents are doing their best to make what are really tough calls when it 
comes to the potential creditworthiness of clients. They also often lack 
expertise in advising entrepreneurs with respect to forming or revising 
their business plans or improving basic accounting practices. The lack of 
professional expertise ends up limiting the success rate of the microlend-
ing program.  
A fifth key and fundamental aspect of the design of the program 
that can clearly be traced to partisan politics is the decision to limit the 
interest rate for this program to six percent annually. For populists like 
Kirchner, setting an interest rate at something high enough to cover 
costs (closer to 25–35 percent annually) is politically untenable. If eco-
nomic logic suggests that interest rates are set by a combination of the 
cost of capital, operational costs, and the relative risk of the borrower, 
political logic suggests that the poorest citizens of society should be 
entitled to pay the lowest interest rate on state subsidized loans. If a 
larger farmer or corporation receives loans at 10 percent or less, the poor 
should not pay more than they do. Indeed, the government decided to 
opt for the ceiling of six percent annually after it was determined that the 
lowest interest rate charged among all other loan assistance programs at 
the federal level was seven percent.3 
The cap on interest rates has forced the government to provide 
heavy subsidies to lending agents – more so than most microcredit pro-
grams in the region. CONAMI subsidizes microcredit in two ways. First, 
CONAMI provides working capital for microcredit services at zero cost 
to the lending organization. The funds are granted to the organization 
and become their funds on receipt, although they must provide an ac-
counting of their eventual use to CONAMI. In contrast to other models, 
funds are not repaid to the state, and the principal returned to the OEs 
from clients remains with them to be lent out again. Second, CONAMI 
realizes that even the subsidy of providing “free” capital does not go far 
enough to sustain microlending practices. Thus, of the amount passed 
on to the lending agents, a minimum of 70 percent is restricted to loan 
capital while up to 30 percent may be used to cover operating expenses. 
The amount allowed for operating costs does vary from OE to OE, and 
must be demonstrated by need of the organization (Gandulfo 2012). 
Why are subsidies needed? One of the central debates of micro-
credit methodology is the weight afforded to the two competing goals of 
maintaining low interest rates without threatening sustainability. The 
                                                 
3  Interview E, Representative of non-profit microcredit network, Buenos Aires, 
28 June 2012. 
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reality is that processing microcredit loans is costlier than traditional 
loans as the former require the loan agent to travel to the microenter-
prise location, conduct several in-person interviews with potential bor-
rowers, their neighbors, and business clients to verify information, and 
undertake a more intensive study of personal financial data (instead of 
gleaning a formal credit score from a centralized bureau). More im-
portantly, since the loans are smaller than traditional loans, a higher per-
centage rate must apply in order to cover these higher costs. The mix of 
low interest rates applied to small loan amounts via an expensive pro-
cessing methodology can easily render the model economically unviable. 
This dilemma is succinctly expressed by Microcredit Enterprises CEO 
Jonathan Lewis: 
We in microfinance uphold the market reality, which demands 
that interest rates sustainably cover a local microfinance institu-
tion’s expenses. No margin, no mission. Nonetheless, there is 
something unseemly about the very wealthy earning unnecessarily 
excessive profits off the unbearably poor. (As quoted in Daley-
Harris 2007: 29) 
The challenge of sustainability becomes exacerbated in the face of two 
additional common problems in Latin America: a high inflationary envi-
ronment and the relatively high cost of formal (vs. informal) labor. 
Loans have had negative real interest rates in Argentina according to 
both official and private estimations (IMF 2016). In addition, several 
interviewees noted the difficulty of hiring credit agents due to the high 
cost of formal labor arrangements, including deposits to government 
regulated insurance and pension programs. These elements constitute a 
significant barrier to expansion and have resulted in some cases of or-
ganizations charging higher interest rates than those officially permitted 
by law to cover these costs. 
Clearly, then, the level of state subsidy for the microcredit sector is 
determined primarily by political and ideological factors championed by 
the left rather than economic or market criteria. The cap of the annual 
interest rate at six percent reflects the leftist target of granting the highest 
level of state subsidy to the poorest of society. To support that rate, 
grants for operational costs to microlending organizations are required. 
The program was originally designed to allow organizations to use up to 
50 percent of their grant for operational costs, but this was reduced for 
political reasons when Muhammad Yunus criticized the Argentine gov-
ernment for using so much of its microcredit funding for bureaucratic 
administration (Gandulfo 2012). The level was reduced to 30 percent, a 
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number that was largely determined as politically defensible, but did not 
take into account the real costs of microcredit processing (see below). 
In sum, the design of Argentina’s National Microcredit program 
clearly bears the imprimatur of a leftist ideological and political project 
that emphasizes state-centered control over microcredit lending in the 
ways noted above. These observations notwithstanding, we must also 
recognize that other, more myopic partisan political motives may lie 
behind the program’s structure. Any aid offered to unorganized or semi-
organized sectors of society could strengthen support at the ballot box 
for the government from that sector, helping to solidify the govern-
ment’s goal of election and re-election. In addition, providing grants to 
low-income NGOs that use funds to sustain and expand personnel is, in 
some real ways, analogous to offering public employment. Third, since 
funds are not paid back to the state, reporting mechanisms to the state 
can constitute a weak form of accountability. These observations point 
to the ability of administrators to achieve these other political goals 
through program implementation, to which I now turn.  
Leftist Politics and Microcredit Policy  
Implementation 
To what extent have partisan political considerations affected the man-
ner in which Argentina’s microcredit program has been implemented? 
While the design of the program opens the way for clientelistic practices, 
the actual implementation of the program in a clientelistic manner is not 
a logical necessity. Indeed, administrators emphasized the non-partisan 
nature of the program. Yet ample evidence suggests partisan quid-pro-
quo concerns have motivated government administrators in determining 
who and when organizations received funding through the program. 
My interviewees differed sharply on this question depending on 
whether they personally felt in sync with the Kirchner wing of the Pe-
ronist Party. One anti-Peronist, for example, opined that the “entire 
program is politically motivated, pure and simple.”4 Another was a bit 
more forgiving, noting that:  
After what started as a program that was designed to work with 
several of us organizations working in microcredit, it quickly be-
came fragmented politically, and we [...] did not have any interest 
                                                 
4  Interview A, Representative of NGO, Córdoba, 17 July 2013.  
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in supporting any partisan political project. That is why we have 
not participated with [the National Microcredit Program].5 
Other interviewees were slightly less emphatic about the partisan nature 
of the program, admitting that funds were undoubtedly funneled in the 
direction of political supporters, but not seeing patronage as the main 
objective of the program. 
Logically, many of the social justice based organization leaders of 
the OAs or OEs of the microcredit program with whom I spoke were 
full-throated supporters of the anti-neoliberal nature of Argentina’s mi-
crocredit policy and its strong pro-social justice nature. These program 
administrators clearly identify with the Peronist ideology of supporting 
social policies that help rescue and defend citizenship, and help the poor 
recover their rights and basic standing as subjects with rights. For exam-
ple, one interviewee stated unabashedly: 
We help [entrepreneurs] organize fairs and trade shows and invite 
members of the community so that they can see that we work 
with entrepreneurs, and so that it’s possible to see that we have a 
new line of social policies that we are implementing in this coun-
try since 2003. We are very grateful for and have great admiration 
for this great national and popular project that was led by Néstor 
Kirchner, and today by Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Clearly 
our province is of the same line as the national government. We 
come from the same place and we’re walking together.6 
Most representatives who were supportive of the Kirchners also rejected 
the patronage claims of other OE and OA representatives, and were 
adamant that the microcredit program was being administered strictly 
according to the non-partisan criteria set by laws and regulations. 
While the evidence presented here may not be whole or complete, it 
does suggest that the manner in which some policymakers have used the 
program was shaped by partisan political concerns. Specifically, the state 
used the program to help sustain civic organizations whose aim is to 
fight for greater social justice – an aim that is well in line with Peronism. 
In addition, the anti-Peronist governors of San Luis Province and the 
city of Buenos Aires refused to cooperate with the national government 
on the program in their locales specifically because it was incubated, 
formed, and implemented by their political adversaries. These facts help 
                                                 
5  Interview B, Representative of NGO, Córdoba, 16 July 2013. 
6  Interview C, Government administrator, Tucuman, 11 July 2012. 
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to explain the lack of continual growth in the microcredit sector in Ar-
gentina. 
Leftist Politics and National Microcredit  
Program Outcomes 
The first way to measure outcomes is simply to measure success in terms 
of some of the “normal” parameters employed by microcredit agencies 
worldwide. The three parameters considered in this section are (1) ex-
pansion of microcredit services, (2) repayment rates, and (3) the extent to 
which the programs are sustainable. Some evidence suggests that Argen-
tina’s microcredit model has been a success with respect to diffusion of 
microlending. With the inception of the Microcredit Law in 2006, the 
government passed the mark of 250,000 loans in May of 2012 according 
to an unpublished government report (CONAMI 2012b). Both Minister 
Alicia Kirchner and President Cristina Fernandez Kirchner marked the 
occasion with a special press covered celebration/rally at the Bicentenni-
al Museum in Buenos Aires (Visión Siete 2013). 
While crossing such milestones is to be lauded, the question is 
whether reaching this mark after six years should be considered success-
ful. As noted above, however, Argentina had the lowest number of bor-
rowers for its size in the region. Argentina has expanded significantly 
more slowly than Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, where diffusion rates are 
29, 117, and 270 times greater, respectively, than in Argentina (Table 1). 
What are the main causes of this lack of dissemination, and are they 
tied to political considerations? Even absent a full comparative analysis 
in the region, some clues are evident through my interviews and other 
data. Most notably, the program has had a hard time keeping up with the 
required bureaucratic paperwork for OAs to receive their annual funding 
disbursement. One OA representative explained just how frustrating it 
was to wait for such second and third time funding remittance from the 
central government. He noted: 
There may be political will, but the state is bureaucratic, and if 
you’re not the nephew of [President] Cristina [Fernandez], or if 
you have a bad relationship with the Ministry [of Social Develop-
ment], it’s going to take longer. We had to wait for over two years 
to get refunded from CONAMI. That is two years without salaries 
for credit agents.7 
                                                 
7  Interview F, Representative of NGO, Cordoba, 4 July 2012. 
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Another OA representative also noted that trying to run a program that 
is dependent on a state where funds do not arrive on time makes it ex-
ceedingly difficult to maintain services. He stated: 
A credit agent may stay on for a month or two receiving no salary 
in the hope that the money from the federal government will be 
arriving soon, but these people have families to feed and cannot 
work for free. Thus, all the work of training them and all they 
learned during their first year of experience gets lost.8 
High level administrators of CONAMI admitted both in 2012 and in 
follow-up interviews in 2015 that problems of bureaucracy have plagued 
the program from inception, even as they claimed that resolving these 
problems was a priority for them and well on its way to being resolved 
(Gandulfo 2012; Solís 2015). They emphasized that heavy regulation was 
a necessary evil in order to prevent corruption and ensure accountability. 
These outcomes are at least indirectly linked to the government’s 
decision to structure and implement the microcredit program in the 
fashion it does. Other countries commonly regulate MFIs whose focus is 
solely on microcredit. These MFIs have a greater incentive to seek out 
other funds for their lending programs, and to build up their own funds 
over time from microlending. At times, subnational or national govern-
ment agencies and/or regional or national development banks may offer 
a limited level of funds at partially subsidized rates (as is the case in vari-
ous parts of Brazil). The restrictions of six percent annual interest rate 
and 30 percent of grants to cover operational costs – again, decisions 
based on leftist political concerns – undercut the spread of microlending 
in Argentina. 
Another common outcome measure is to examine the repayment 
rate. For years, Yunus praised microcredit borrowers for their consisten-
cy in paying back their loans. Originally, the Grameen Bank typically 
experienced successful repayment rates of up to 97 percent. When these 
rates slipped down to 80 percent in the late 1990s, they adjusted their 
methodologies and performance improved (Dowla and Barua 2006). An 
unpublished CONAMI report from May of 2012 claims a repayment 
rate of 92 percent (CONAMI 2012b). Unfortunately, according to sever-
al of my interviewees, such a statistic seems unreasonable and unreliable 
in the case of Argentina. A former central administrator for CONAMI 
forcefully rejected the repayment rate as utter nonsense stating flatly: 
                                                 
8  Interview G, Representative of NGO, Tucuman, 11 July 2012. 
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I don’t believe it. CONAMI doesn’t do evaluations because there 
is no political will to do them. If CONAMI has a 92 percent re-
payment rate, and the average loan is for six months, and the pro-
gram has been going on for at least five years, and with each suc-
cessful loan an entrepreneur can increase the subsequent size of 
the loan, then at this point we should be seeing an average loan 
size of over 5000 pesos, and yet it remains at about 1500 pesos. So 
if all these people are paying back, where is all that money that has 
been paid back? In addition, CONAMI renews funding at 100 
percent or more of the original amount. Why would they do that 
over and over again if entrepreneurs were really paying all that 
money back?9 
Another OA representative noted that the repayment rate had fluctuated 
significantly with some periods as high as 95 percent, but with other 
periods as low as 50 percent.10 Probably more telling, however, was the 
an interview with one OE director, who added: 
We made a lot of mistakes in the beginning and truly it was a total 
loss. We had no idea what we were doing then like we do now. 
But we also knew that if we told CONAMI the truth, our entre-
preneurs would not receive funding again. So we reported that all 
of the funds were paid back in full so that we could get a fresh set 
of funds to loan out again.11 
While the frankness of this latter interviewee is appreciated, it opens up 
the question of the integrity of the reporting system. If her group can 
have 100 percent failure rate, but freely admits that it reported 100 per-
cent success to government officials, then clearly the bureaucratic delays 
in approving subsequent funding by CONAMI cannot be due to strong 
accountability mechanisms. 
A third outcome for the program is sustainability. CONAMI claims 
to foster sustainability by subsidizing microcredit operations even while 
employing a limit of six percent annual interest rate. Beyond being too 
slow in the refunding process, one OA representative told me that the 
70/30 ratio of capital funds to operational cost was still a major barrier 
to sustainability. He said: 
Some of our OEs use a higher interest rate than CONAMI allows. 
They use 10 percent over six months. We allow them because we 
                                                 
9  Interview H, Former CONAMI administrator, Córdoba, 5 July 2012. 
10  Interview I, Representative of NGO, Tucumán, 11 July 2012. 
11  Interview J, Representative of NGO, Tucumán, 12 July 2012. 
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know it’s necessary. CONAMI doesn’t allow this, but CONAMI 
is not here in the trenches every day.12 
Another OE representative noted that his organization has access to 
funding from other sources that allow them to charge higher interest 
rates. He uses the funds generated from those lines to help cover opera-
tional costs of the CONAMI funds. In other words, were solely 
CONAMI funds and restrictions available to him, he would not be able 
to run the program.13 The general consensus among interviewees is that 
the limit of 30 percent of funds for operational costs may be reasonable 
in some cases, but that the subsidy must be increased to 40 or even 50 
percent in many cases to ensure sustainability. 
Conclusion 
This brief foray into the politics of microcredit policies suggests that 
partisan political considerations play a strong role in shaping microcredit 
policy design, implementation, and outcomes. The leftist Peronist gov-
ernment established a state-centered program that maintained extensive 
control over funding while dictating loan conditions that prioritized 
political considerations over economic viability. Implementation of the 
program was partially shaped by the political arena in which a large orga-
nized populist party was forced to respond to demands for patronage in 
order to maintain political support. Through its implementation, the 
government remained lax in its oversight, channeled funds to provinces 
and groups that were more in line with their specific ideological 
worldview, and was often unable to engender cooperation in locales led 
by its political opponents. In the end, these factors weighed heavily in 
limiting the impact of microcredit lending in Argentina compared to 
other countries in the region.  
More broadly, this study points to the key factor of partisan politics, 
and how governments can “get in the way” of helping the poor in some 
cases (Warby 2016). Examining how microcredit policy can be harnessed 
(if not hijacked) to help support particular partisan goals or further a 
specific ideological project in the eyes of policymakers helps us under-
stand how and why microcredit programs may experience limited suc-
cess in some places. Moreover, understanding how local political inter-
ests and considerations intersect with those of other domestic and global 
actors in a more global context (Olsen 2010; Weber 2006) can lead to an 
                                                 
12  Interview K, Representative of NGO, Córdoba, 4 July 2012. 
13  Interview L, Representative of NGO, Córdoba, 17 July 2012. 
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honest evaluation of the real possibilities of microlending as a tool to 
reduce poverty and improve social inclusion. Studies of microcredit that 
do not appreciate the partisan political context in which actors and 
agents operate will likewise fail to elucidate the real possibilities and 
limits of reform and change. 
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La política izquierdista y los límites del microcrédito en Argentina 
Resumen: El éxito de los programas de préstamos de microcrédito 
depende, en parte, del marco regulatorio que los diseñadores de políticas 
crean para apoyarlos. Un hecho que muchos análisis de microcrédito 
frecuentemente ignoran es que este marco está formado por considera-
ciones ideológicas y políticas partidistas de líderes políticos. En Argenti-
na, los gobiernos peronistas de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner lanzaron y 
apoyaron un programa de microcrédito centrado en el Estado caracteri-
zado por condiciones estrictas de préstamos y subvenciones estatales 
directas para el capital y los costos operativos a organizaciones sin fines 
de lucro que apoyaban en gran medida al peronismo. Provincias y muni-
cipios gobernados por anti-peronistas se negaron a participar. Como 
resultado, el Programa Nacional de Microcrédito ha llegado a mimetizar 
en gran medida políticas de patrocinio pasadas, generando dependencia 
de los recursos gubernamentales y amenazando así su viabilidad a largo 
plazo. Este artículo explora el impacto del proyecto ideológico y político 
de la izquierda en la política, implementación y resultados del microcrédi-
to en Argentina. 
Palabras clave: Argentina, política de microcrédito, política izquierdista, 
microfinanzas, Kirchnerismo 
 
